BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
207.23.0.0/16
Announced exactly
- 207.23.0.0/16AS271BCNETRPKI Not found207.23.0.0
- Registry
- ARIN · Canada · Jan 4, 1996
- Delegated block
- 207.23.0.0 – 207.23.255.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 207.23.8.0/21AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.8.0
- 207.23.72.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.72.0
- 207.23.73.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.73.0
- 207.23.85.0/24AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valid207.23.85.0
- 207.23.86.0/24AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valid207.23.86.0
- 207.23.88.0/23AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.88.0
- 207.23.94.0/23AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valid207.23.94.0
- 207.23.96.0/20AS397543Royal Roads UniversityRPKI Valid207.23.96.0
- 207.23.128.0/19AS397375PROVINCIAL HEALTH SERVICES AUTHORITYRPKI Valid207.23.128.0
- 207.23.160.0/19AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valid207.23.160.0
- 207.23.192.0/19AS11105Simon Fraser UniversityRPKI Valid207.23.192.0
- 207.23.238.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.238.0
- 207.23.240.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.240.0
- 207.23.241.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.241.0
- 207.23.242.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.242.0
- 207.23.243.0/24AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valid207.23.243.0
- 207.23.245.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.245.0
- 207.23.246.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.246.0
- 207.23.249.0/24AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valid207.23.249.0
- 207.23.252.0/24AS393249University of British ColumbiaRPKI Valid207.23.252.0
- 207.23.253.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.253.0
- 207.23.254.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.254.0
- 207.23.255.0/24AS271BCNETRPKI Valid207.23.255.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 62.103.0.0/16. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.